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THE BIGNESS COMPLEX: INDUSTRY, LABOR, AND GOVERNMENT IN 
THE AMERICAN ECONOMY. By Walter Adams and James w. Brock 
New York: Pantheon Books. 1986. Pp. vii, 426. $22.95. 
Over the past decade, economists, economic journalists, and politi-
cians have commented endlessly on the inability of American firms to 
compete in international markets. Although analyses and policy pre-
scriptions vary, many commentators have suggested that the nation 
should abandon its "antiquated" notions of antitrust to restore the 
competitive position of its firms. 1 These commentators, representing 
positions all along the ideological spectrum, argue that given modern 
economic conditions and production technologies, economic organiza-
tions of extremely large scale are necessary to achieve economically 
efficient production (pp. 27-29). Commentators on opposing ends of 
the spectrum disagree about the optimal make-up and nature of these 
giant organizations, but not about the need for great size (pp. 4-7, 351-
67). 
In The Bigness Complex, Walter Adams2 and James W. Brock3 
argue that the gigantic size these commentators advocate is part of the 
nation's economic problem, not part of a solution to that problem. 
The Bigness Complex systematically debunks what its authors label 
the "mythical assumptions" on which the pervasive belief that "bigger 
is necessary" rests. The authors' analysis shows that gigantic size not 
only fails to produce the assumed efficiency gains, but more often re-
sults in reduced efficiency. Adams and Brock argue further that even 
if Bigness did result in some efficiency gains, the apologists of Bigness 
fail to consider the deleterious effects of the power that accrues to the 
gigantic economic organizations they advocate. The giants use this 
power to influence the government and to avoid the discipline of the 
marketplace. All in all, the book presents a readable and spirited de-
fense of the virtues of controlled competition and the traditional 
American concept of antitrust at a time when these values are ne-
glected, and even rejected, in almost all of the literature accessible to 
the layperson. 
Adams and Brock divide their exposition into five parts. In part 1, 
the authors contrast the importance of power - economic and polit-
ical, private and public - with the dearth of recognition accorded 
power in traditional academic economics (chs. 1 & 2). The authors 
suggest that it is largely the recognition of'the role of power that leads 
1. See, e.g., Baldridge, Rx/or Export Woes: Antitrust Relief, Wall St. J., Oct. 15, 1985, at 28, 
col. 3; Thurow, Let's Abolish the Antitrost Laws, N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1980, sec. 3, at 2, col. 3. 
2. Distinguished University Professor and former president, Michigan State University, 
member of Attorney General Brownell's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws. B.A. 
1942, Brooklyn College; M.A. 1946, Yale University; Ph.D. 1947, Yale University. 
3. Associate Professor of Economics, Miami University (Ohio). B.S. 1973, University of Wy-
oming; M.A. 1975, University of Wyoming; Ph.D. 1981, Michigan State University. 
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them to reject the "Bigness Complex" (pp. 7, 14-21). Although the 
authors' attempt to define the term power may not be entirely satisfy-
ing as a matter of formal theory, most readers will have little difficulty 
accepting the proposition that the ability of gigantic organizations to 
influence government is a manifestation of power. 
After discussing generally the role they believe power should play 
in economic theory and analysis, the authors proceed in part 2 to ex-
amine the empirical foundations of the assumption on which most 
economists ground their support for Bigness - that Big is efficient. 
The authors note that there are three facets to the concept of efficiency 
- operating efficiency, innovation efficiency, and social efficiency -
and divide their discussion accordingly. 
The authors first tackle the relationship between size and operating 
efficiency (ch. 3). The question here is whether production costs fall as 
size increases. Operating efficiency requires that both production units 
(i.e., factories) and administrative units (i.e., firms) be of optimal scale. 
Adams and Brock accept the notion that modern production tech-
niques require production units of some considerable size. Studies by 
Joe S. Bain in the 1950s4 and F.M. Sherer in the late 1970s,5 however, 
have shown that production unit efficiencies do not require firms of the 
size that many advocate today. A defense of Bigness resting on oper-
ating efficiency, therefore, must be grounded on the more controversial 
notion that large firm size produces significant administrative 
efficiencies. 
Administrative efficiencies are said to result from the ability to 
spread administrative expenses over several production units, elimi-
nating duplicative administrative functions. Adams and Brock ex-
amine evidence from several industries and conclude that 
administrative efficiency fails to justify Bigness. 6 The authors find that 
after a firm achieves the size necessary to employ production units of 
efficient scale, a size considerably smaller than the average firm in 
many industries today, increased firm size not only fails to create fur-
ther efficiencies but may often result in efficiency losses. 
4. See J. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 73, 85-88 (1956). 
5. See F.M. SHERER, THE EcONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATION 339 (Harvard Eco-
nomic Studies, vol. 145, 1975). 
6. Pp. 42-45. The authors first note that despite the steel industry's need for enormous pro-
duction units, it is the single plant "mini-mill" firms that are meeting foreign competition while 
domestic giants such as USX are successful only in obtaining ever higher tariffs from an ever 
more pliable Congress. Pp. 34-38. The authors then consider the automotive industry where 
General Motors has recently established its Saturn division with the goal of making the new 
venture as independent as possible from the stifling GM bureaucracy. Pp. 40-41. Finally the 
authors examine the recent trend toward conglomerate Bigness and argue that the evidence sug-
gests that the combination of functionally unrelated firms in a single conglomerate structure has 
resulted in significant efficiency losses. The authors believe that the recent trend toward divesti-
tures reflects the business community's delayed recognition of the inadvisability of conglomerate 
structure. Pp. 41-45. 
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The authors next consider the relationship between firm size and 
innovation efficiency (ch. 4). The appropriate inquiry here is whether 
a firm's virtuosity in developing and improving products and methods 
of production increases as a function of firm size. Contrary to the 
image carefully cultivated by the largest corporations' advertising de-
partments, 7 the authors' data suggests that smaller firms expend 
greater efforts in the pursuit of innovation and achieve a greater inno-
vative output at a lower cost (pp. 50-57). Thus, despite the theoretical 
advantages of large firms, small firms and even individuals are more 
prolific innovators. 8 
In chapter 5 the authors tum to the final facet of the concept of 
efficiency, the question of social efficiency. The question here is 
whether, given certain technological limitations, an economy of large 
firms produces a more desirable combination of goods and services 
than an economy of smaller firms. In the academic economist's world 
of "perfect competition," the market mechanism coordinates the activ-
ities of the economy, allocates scarce resources, and achieves optimal 
economic outcomes. In an economy of concentrated industries, how-
ever, much of this planning is taken from the impersonal forces of the 
market and placed in the hands of the corporate giants. Thus, an 
economy dominated by a few giant firms will produce a less desirable 
combination of goods and services and will skew the allocation of soci-
ety's resources in favor of the giant firms themselves.9 One goal of the 
antitrust laws is to create an economy approximating.this model of 
"perfect competition" so that the market may perform these coordi-
nating and allocative functions. Hence, the authors urge that the anti-
trust laws be strictly enforced to create more competitive markets, 
7. Many economists have also suggested that large firms are better innovators. See, e.g., J.K. 
GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER 86 (2d 
rev. ed. 1956). 
8. Adams and Brock suggest that the red tape, specialization, conformity, and general con-
servatism associated with bureaucratic structures are contrary to the spirit of innovation. Pp. 55-
57. The authors further note that large organizations may have the power and the motivation to 
suppress innovations that could alter the market in which the firms operate. Pp. 61-64. The 
authors' discussion of the suppression of innovation focuses on the pain-control drug industry. 
Pp. 62-64. 
9. Adams and Brock illustrate the influence of gigantic corporations in social planning by 
considering the role of General Motors in the development of urban transportation, pp. 67-69, 
automotive fuel consumption, pp. 69-72, and automotive emissions and air pollution, pp. 72-74. 
In each of these three areas, GM's interests differed significantly from what most would consider 
society's interests. The oligopolistic structure of the auto industry and GM's tremendous eco-
nomic and political clout nonetheless allowed the corporation to impede the development of 
pollution-free electric trains in favor of GM-produced cars a.nd buses in urban transportation, to 
restrict production of more fuel efficient but less profitable small cars, and to slow the develop-
ment of pollution control devices despite increasing evidence of the damage automotive emissions 
caused. 
The authors also discuss the role of Big Oil in securing oil import restraints that artificially 
accelerated the rate at which America's domestic oil reserves were depleted, and the role of these 
same companies in the suppression of alternative energy sources. Pp. 74-78. 
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resulting in a more desirable combination of goods and services than 
results from our current economic structure. 
After dispensing with the arguments of those who attempt to jus-
tify the power of Bigness by reference to efficiency gains, Adams and 
Brock ask in part 3 how a society can be structured to avoid the con-
glomeration of power inherent in a political or economic system domi-
nated by a few large-scale structures. For Adams and Brock, the 
answers to this architectural question were framed in the years after 
· 1776. In chapter 6, the authors discuss how the founders constructed 
a governmental system of separated powers such that no one branch of 
government could tum the coercive power of the state against another 
or against the people. The American constitutional system, however, 
provides only for the control of public power; it does not concern itself 
with the undue conglomerations of private power that may pose a 
greater threat today (pp. 94-95). 
For a plan to control great concentrations of private power, Ad-
ams and Brock look to Adam Smith's 1776 work, The Wealth of Na-
tions. As the authors interpret Smith's work in chapter 7, the ' 
competitive market scatters economic power widely among the people, 
leaving no individual or group of individuals capable of exerting undue 
private power. The market itself is said to serve as society's regulatory 
authority and planning mechanism (pp. 101-03). The authors submit 
that the political blueprint of the American Constitution and the eco-
nomic blueprint of Smith's The Wealth of Nations still provide the best 
available plans for avoiding concentrations of power antithetical to 
both efficiency and individual liberty (pp. 85-86). 
Adams and Brock, contrary to the proponents of the Chicago 
School, do not interpret Smith's blueprint to mean that the competi-
tive market is a self-perpetuating product of nature (pp. 110-13, 211-
12). They see the competitive market as a delicate mechanism that 
can easily be subverted by private interests wishing to escape its disci-
pline or desiring to take over its planning function. In part 4, the au-
thors maintain that a society that seeks the benefits of a free enterprise 
system must vigilantly protect the competitive market from "subver-
sion and erosion." In chapter 8 the authors argue that in the United 
States, this protection is accomplished through the antitrust laws. Ac-
cording to the authors, "Just as the purpose of the U.S. Constitution 
was to prevent cartels or monopolies from controlling the coercive 
power of the state, so the basic objective of antitrust is to prevent them 
from controlling economic decision-making in a free society." 10 
After establishing the importance of antitrust to the proper func-
10. P. 108. As the passage indicates, Adams and Brock believe that the "basic objective" of 
the antitrust laws is the control of the economic and political power that arises from economic 
concentration. Other commentators reject the notion that the antitrust laws should be used to 
control corporate power, arguing that they should be concerned solely with greater economic 
efficiency. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). The view that economic effi-
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tioning of the economy, Adams and Brock proceed in chapter 9 
through chapter 15 to examine and critique historical and modem ap-
plications of the antitrust laws. The authors work sequentially 
through the major judicial precedents and current trends in the anti-
trust areas of conspiracy (ch. 9), monopoly (ch. 10), and mergers (ch. 
11)-horizontal (ch. 12), vertical (ch. 13), and conglomerate (ch. 14). 
The authors' analysis suggests that although the antitrust laws could 
operate as an effective guardian of the competitive market, current en-
forcement practices and, to a lesser extent, current doctrinal trends 
make today's antitrust laws an insufficient protector of the competitive 
system.II 
In part 5, the authors argue that the maintenance of a competitive 
economy may often require government action beyond enforcement of 
the antitrust laws. The authors see a further role for the government 
in several areas where competitive markets fail. Unlike some on the 
political right, Adams and Brock see an important role for govern-
ment in the exercise of the state's traditional police powers. Govern-
ment, not the market, the authors believe, must make decisions about 
health and safety, pollution, toxic wastes, military spending, and ge-
netic engineering (p. 211). They also recognize that the government 
should regulate "natural monopolies" (pp. 211-12). 
The danger of governmental involvement, according to the au-
thors, is that the regulation necessary to correct market failures will, 
through the influence of private power, be turned into a system in 
which the government permits and even aids the industry's avoidance 
of competition. The authors note that it was a laudable concern with 
safety that caused the government to begin its regulation of the airline 
industry. After the regulation began, however, it was transformed, 
through collusion between the government and the industry, into a 
means of escaping competition. I2 The authors suggest, therefore, that 
subject to restraints imposed by the government's rightful interests in 
exercising its police powers, regulating natural monopolies, and con-
trolling externalities, deregulation should be implemented so that reg-
ulated industries will again be subject to the rigors of the marketplace 
rather than to the dictates of an often pliable governmental agency 
(ch. 19). 
Some commentators have suggested that we need not worry about 
ciency is the sole goal of the antitrust laws may currently command a majority of the Supreme 
Court. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). 
11. See pp. 194-208. The authors note particularly that antitrust, especially the criminal 
branch of antitrust enforcement, is a political instrument. As a political instrument it is subject 
to the influence of the political power of the very enterprises it is designed to regulate. P. 208. 
12. See pp. 219-31. Other examples cited include the ability of the steel and automotive 
industries to obtain significant tariffs and quotas against foreign competition (ch. 20), the govern-
ment bailouts of Lockheed and Chrysler (ch. 22), and government subsidization of nuclear power 
in the face of huge cost overruns and concerns about reactor safety and waste disposal (ch. 21). 
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concentrations of private power because each concentration of power 
is counterbalanced by an opposing concentration.13 Thus, labor 
power, industrial power, and governmental power are said to balance 
one another, each concentration preventing the other two from caus-
ing harm. As Adams and Brock point out in part 6, however, these 
purportedly opposing powers not only fail to counter one another, but 
often coalesce into an even stronger power block. When the UAW 
joined the auto companies in calling for trade restrictions and demand-
ing the bailout of Chrysler, we saw an example of the "Labor-Indus-
trial Complex" (ch. 23). The authors also discuss the "Military-
Industrial Complex" and the revolving personnel door between the 
military and the handful of important military contractors (ch. 24). 
The authors conclude that, contrary to the favorable claims made 
for it, disproportionate size gives rise to economic and political power 
that undermines operation, innovation, and social efficiency, erodes ef-
fective competition and good economic performance, and permits the 
manipulation of public policy. The authors urge that economic power 
be dispersed to the maximum extent feasible. While not offering an 
exhaustive list of policy proposals, they suggest tighter restrictions on 
mergers (pp. 372-73), further deregulation of industries that are natu-
rally competitive (pp. 373-74), reduced barriers to foreign trade (pp. 
374-75), increased competitive bidding for defense contracts (pp. 375-
77), and a policy of refusing to bail out failing private firms regardless 
of their size and political power.14 
The Bigness Complex is a very readable book. While apparently 
adding little, if anything, new to the technical literature, the authors' 
tone of reasoned yet spirited advocacy allows the book to impart a 
great deal of information without reading like an almanac. The au-
thors appear to be addressing the educated lay audience and explain 
the economic concepts they employ in a way that even the most 
number-shy will find accessible. The book seems ideally suited for use 
in an undergraduate political economy course. Nonetheless, there is 
likely much that even the more specialized reader can gain from this 
work. 15 
Moreover, the book fills an important gap in the recent economic 
literature. Much has been written over the last several years advocat-
13. The classic statement of this theory is John Kenneth Galbraith's 1952 work AMERICAN 
CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER. See note 7, supra. 
14. Pp. 377·78. While urging the adoption of these proposals, the authors recognize that the 
Bigness Complex has a strong foothold in both the Reagan administration and the Congress and, 
therefore, that there is little likelihood that any of these proposals will be adopted in the near 
future. Pp. 378·79. 
15. For those with a technical background in both economics and American antitrust law, 
see Adams and Brock, The 'New Learning' and the Euthanasia of Antitrust, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 
1515 (1986). This excellent article presents most of the arguments made in The Bigness Complex 
without the background explanation included in the book. 
May 1988) Tort and Commercial Law 1253 
ing the adoption of an industrial policy16 or, conversely, advocating 
the almost complete withdrawal of the government's influence in the 
economy.17 Yet no work accessible to the layperson has presented an 
adequate defense of the economic assumptions underlying traditional 
American antitrust policies: that decentralization of power, both polit-
ical and economic, not only increases political liberty but also en-
hances economic performance. The Bigness Complex succeeds 
brilliantly in filling this gap in the literature. 
- James R. Steffen 
16. See, e.g., R. REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER (1983). 
17. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE (1980). 
